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Abstract
Many data mining and analytical tasks rely on the abstraction of networks (graphs)
to summarize relational structures among individuals (nodes). Since relational data
are often sensitive, we aim to seek effective approaches to release utility-preserved
yet privacy-protected structured data. In this paper, we leverage the differential
privacy (DP) framework, to formulate and enforce rigorous privacy constraints on
deep graph generation models, with a focus on edge-DP to guarantee individual
link privacy. In particular, we enforce edge-DP by injecting Gaussian noise to
the gradients of a link prediction based graph generation model, and ensure data
utility by improving structure learning with structure-oriented graph comparison.
Extensive experiments on two real-world network datasets show that our proposed
DPGGEN model is able to generate networks with effectively preserved global
structure and rigorously protected individual link privacy.
1 Introduction
Nowadays, open data of networks play a pivotal role in data mining and data analytics [49, 44, 5, 34].
By releasing and sharing structured relational data with research facilities and enterprise partners,
data companies are harvesting the enormous potential value from their data, which benefits decision
making on various aspects including social, financial, environmental, through collectively improved
ads, recommendation, retention and so on [56, 57, 47, 30]. However, network data usually encode
sensitive information not only about individuals but also their interactions, which makes direct release
and exploitation rather unsafe. More importantly, even with careful anonymization, individual privacy
is still at stake under collective attack models facilitated by the underlying network structure [63, 8].
Can we find a way to securely release network data without drastic sanitization that essentially renders
the released data useless?
To deal with such tension between the need to release utilizable data and the concern of data owners’
privacy, quite a few models have been proposed recently, focusing on grid-based data like images,
texts and gene sequences [19, 42, 50, 39, 38, 54, 9, 7, 15, 33, 62]. However, none of the existing
models can be directly applied to the network (graph) setting. While a secure generative model on
grid-based data apparently aims to preserve high-level semantics (e.g., class distributions) and protect
detailed training data (e.g., exact images or sentences), it remains obtuse what to be preserved and
what to be protected for network data, due to its modeling of complex interactive objects.
Motivating scenario. In Figure 1, a bank aims to encourage public studies on the community
structures of its customers. It does so by firstly anonymizing all users in the network and then sharing
the anonymized network (i.e., network (a) in Figure 1) to the public. However, an attacker interested
in knowing the financial interactions (e.g., money transfer) between particular customers can easily
get access to another public social network and locate a group of users that likely overlap with the
customers in network (a) (e.g., by leveraging public user attributes). Simple graph properties like node
degree distribution and triangle count can then be used to identify specific users with high accuracy
Preprint. Under review.
ar
X
iv
:2
00
5.
00
45
5v
1 
 [c
s.S
I] 
 1 
M
ay
 20
20
(a) Anonymized original net. (b) DPGGEN generated net.
Figure 1: A toy pair of anonymized and generated networks.
(e.g., customer A as the only node with degree 5 and within 1 triangle, and customer B as the only
node with degree 2 and within 1 triangle). Thus, the attacker confidently knows the identities of A
and B and the fact that they have financial interactions, which seriously harms customers’ privacy
and poses potential crises.
In this work, we formulate the goal of secure network release as preserving global network structure
while protecting individual link privacy. Continue with the toy example, the solution we propose is
to train a graph neural network model on the original network and release the generated networks
(e.g., (b) in Figure 1). Towards the utility of generated networks, we require them to be similar to
the original networks from a global perspective, which can be measured by various graph global
properties (e.g., network (b) has very similar degree distribution and the same triangle count as (a)).
In this way, we expect many downstream data mining and analytical tasks on them to produce similar
results as on the original networks. As for privacy protection, we require that the information in the
generated networks cannot confidently reveal the existence or absence of any individual links in the
original networks (e.g., the attacker may still identify customers A and B in network (b), but their
individual link structure has changed).
However, there are two unique challenges in learning such structure-preserved and privacy-protected
graph generation models, which have not been explored by existing literature so far.
Challenge 1: Rigorous protection of individual link privacy. The rich relational structures in
graph data often allow attackers to recover private information through various ways of collective
inference [61, 40, 2]. Moreover, graph structure can always be converted to numerical features such
as spectral embedding, after which most attacks on grid-based data like model inversion [18] and
membership inference [46] can be directly applied for link identification. How can we design an
effective mechanism with rigorous privacy protection on links in networks against various attacks?
Challenge 2: Effective preservation of global network structure. In order to capture global
network structure, the model has to constantly compare the structures of the input and currently
generated graphs during training. However, unlike images and other grid-based data, graphs have
flexible structures, and thus lack efficient universal representations [13]. How can we allow a network
generation model to effectively learn from the structural difference between two graphs, without
conducting very time-costly operations like isomorphism tests all the time?
Present work. In this work, for the first time, we draw attention to the secure release of network
data with deep generative models. Technically, towards the aforementioned two challenges, we
develop Differentially Private Graph Generative Nets (DPGGEN), which imposes DP training over
a link prediction based network generation model for rigorous individual link privacy protection,
and further ensures structure-oriented graph comparison for effective global network structure
preservation. In particular, we first formulate and enforce edge-DP via Gaussian gradient distortion
by injecting designed noise into the sensitive modules during model training. Then we leverage
graph convolutional networks [29] through a variational generative adversarial network architecture
[22, 32] to enable structure-oriented network generation.
To evaluate the effectiveness of DPGGEN, we conduct extensive experiments on two real-world
network datasets. On one hand, we evaluate the utility of generated networks by computing a suite of
commonly concerned graph properties to compare the global structure of generated networks with
the original ones. On the other hand, we validate the privacy of individual links by evaluating links
predicted from the generated networks on the original networks. Consistent experimental results
show that DPGGEN is able to effectively generate networks that are similar to the original ones
regarding global network structure, while at the same time useless towards individual link prediction.
2
2 Related Work
Differential Privacy (DP). With graph structured data, two types of privacy constraint can be applied,
i.e., node-DP [26] and edge-DP [4], which define two neighboring graphs to differ by at most one
node or edge. In this work, we aim at the secure release of network data, and particularly, we focus on
edge privacy, because it is essential for the protection of object interactions unique for network data in
comparison with other types of data. Several existing works have studied the protection of edge-DP.
For example, [43] generates graphs based on the statistical representations extracted from the original
graphs blurred by designed noise, whereas [51] enforces the parameters of dK-graph models to be
private. However, based on shallow graph generation models, they do not flexibly capture global
network structure that can support various unknown downstream analytical tasks [63, 52].
Recent advances in deep learning has led to the rapid development of DP-oriented learning schemes.
For example, [1] refines the analysis of privacy costs, which provides tighter estimation on the
overall privacy loss by tracking detailed information of the stochastic gradient descent process. DP
learning has also been widely adapted to generative models [19, 42, 50, 39, 38, 54, 9, 7, 15, 33, 62].
For example, [19, 9, 7, 62] share the same spirit by enforcing DP on the discriminators, and thus
inductively on the generators, in a generative adversarial network (GAN) scheme. However, none of
them can be directly applied to graph data due to the lack of consideration on structure generation.
Graph Generation (GGen). GGen has been studied for decades and widely used to synthesize
network data used towards the development of various collective analysis and mining models [17, 23].
Earlier works mainly use probabilistic models to generate graphs with certain properties [16, 53, 3, 41],
which are manually designed based on sheer observations and prior assumptions.
Thanks to the surge of deep learning, many advanced GGen models have been developed recently,
which leverage different powerful neural networks in a learn-to-generate manner [28, 6, 60, 48, 35,
59, 25, 21, 12, 64, 36]. For example, NetGAN [6] converts graphs into biased random walks, learns
the generation of walks with GAN, and assembles the generated walks into graphs; GraphRNN [60]
regards the generation of graphs as node-and-edge addition sequences, and models it with a heuristic
breadth-first-search scheme and hierarchical RNN. These neural network based models can often
generate graphs with much richer properties and flexible structures learned from real-world graphs.
To the best of our knowledge, no existing work on deep GGen has looked into the potential privacy
threats laid during the learning and releasing of the powerful models. In fact, such concerns are rather
urgent in the network setting, where sensitive information can often be more easily compromised in a
collective manner [11, 2, 61] and privacy leakage can easily further propagate [40, 65].
3 DPGGEN
In this work, we propose DPGGEN for the secure release of generated networks, whose global graph
structures are similar to the original sensitive networks, but the individual links (edges) between
objects (nodes) are safely protected.
To provide robust privacy guarantees towards various graph attacks, we propose to leverage the
well-studied technique of differential privacy (DP) [14] by enforcing the edge-DP defined as follows.
Definition 1 (Edge Differential Privacy [4]) A randomized mechanismM satisfies (ε, δ)-edge-DP
if for any two neighboring graphs G1,G2 ∈ G, which differ by at most one edge, Pr[M(G1) ∈
S] ≤ exp(ε)× Pr[M(G2) ∈ S] + δ, where S ⊂ range(M).
Our key insight is, a graph generation model M satisfying the above edge-DP should learn to
generate similar graphs if trained with two neighboring graphs that differ by at most one edge; as a
consequence, information in the generated graph does not confidently reveal the existence or absence
of any one particular edge in the original graph, thus protecting individual link privacy.
To ensure DP on individual links, we exploit the existing link reconstruction based graph generation
model GraphVAE [28], and design a training algorithm to dynamically distort the gradients of its
sensitive model parameters by injecting proper amounts of Gaussian noise based on the framework
of DPSGD [1]. Moreover, to improve the capturing of global graph structures, we replace the direct
BCE loss on graph adjacency matrices in GraphVAE with a structure-oriented graph discriminator
based on GCN [29] and the framework of VAEGAN [22].
3
Backbone GraphVAE. Recent research on graph models has been largely focused around GCN
[29], which is shown to be promising in calculating universal graph representations [37, 55, 10, 27].
In this work, we harness the power of GCN under the consideration of edge-DP by adapting the
link reconstruction based graph variational autoencoder (GraphVAE) [28] as our backbone graph
generation model.
Particularly, we are given a graph G = {V,E}, where V is the set of N nodes, and E is the set of
M edges, which can be further modeled by a binary adjacency matrix A. As a common practice [24],
we set the node features X simply as the one-hot node identity matrix. The autoencoder architecture
of GraphVAE consists of a GCN-based graph encoder to guide the learning of a fully connected
feedforward neural network (FNN) based adjacency matrix decoder, which can be trained to directly
reconstruct graphs with similar links as in the input graphs. A stochastic latent variable Z is further
introduced as the latent representation of A as
q(Z|X,A) =
N∏
i=1
q(Zi|X,A) =
N∏
i
N (zi|µi, diag(σ2i )), (1)
where µ = gµ(X,A) is the matrix of mean vectors µi, and σ = gσ(X,A) is the matrix of standard
deviation vectors σi. g•(X,A) = A˜ReLU(A˜XW0)W1 is a two-layer GCN model. gµ and gσ
share the first-layer parameters W0. A˜ = D−
1
2AD−
1
2 is the symmetrically normalized adjacency
matrix of G, with degree matrix Dii =
∑N
j=1Aij . gµ and gσ form the encoder network.
To generate a graph G′, a reconstructed adjacency matrix A′ is computed from Z by a decoder
network as
p(A|Z) =
N∏
i=1
N∏
j=1
p(Aij |zi, zj) =
N∏
i=1
N∏
j=1
σ(f(zi)
T f(zj)), (2)
where σ(z) = 1/(1 + e−z), f is a two-layer FNN appended to Z before the logistic sigmoid function.
It aims to generate individual links to be compared with those in the input graph.
The whole model is trained through standard variational inference by optimizing the following
variational lower bound
Lvae = Lrec + Lprior (3)
= Eq(Z|X,A)[log p(A|Z)]−DKL(q(Z|X,A)||p(Z)),
where Lrec is implemented as the sum of an element-wise binary cross entropy (BCE) loss between
the adjacency matrices of the input and generated graphs, and Lprior is a prior loss based on the
Kullback-Leibler divergence towards the Gaussian prior p(Z) =
∏N
i=1 p(zi) =
∏N
i N (zi|0, I).
Enforcing DP. The probabilistic nature of Z allows the model to be generative, meaning that after
training the model with an input graph G, we can detach and disregard the encoder, and then freely
generate an unlimited amount of graphs G′ with similar links to G, by solely drawing random
samples of Z from the prior distributionN (0, I) and computing A′ with the learned decoder network
w.r.t. Eq. 2. However, as shown in [31, 20], powerful neural network models like VAE can easily
overfit training data, so directly releasing a trained GraphVAE model poses potential privacy threats,
as links in its generated graphs may be highly indicative towards links in the training graphs.
In this work, we care about rigorously protecting the privacy of individual links in the training data,
i.e., ensuring edge-DP. Particularly, in Definition 1, the inequality guarantees that the distinguishability
of any one edge in the graph will be restricted to the privacy leak level proportional to ε; δ relaxes
the outlier nodes existing in the graph. The two parameters together quantify the absolute value of
privacy information possibly to be leaked by the mechanismM, i.e., a graph generation model.
According to Eq. 2, GraphVAE essentially takes a graph G as input and generates a new graph G′
with the same size as output by reconstructing links among the same set of nodes V. Therefore, if we
regard GraphVAE as the mechanismM, as long as its model parameters are properly randomized,
the framework satisfies edge-DP. Particularly, any two input graphs G1 and G2 differing by at most
one edge in principle lead to similar generated graphs G′, so information in G′ does not confidently
reveal the existence or absence of any particular link in G1 or G2. To exploit the well-structured
graph generation framework of GraphVAE, we leverage the technique of Gaussian mechanism to
enforce edge-DP on it.
4
Theorem 1 (Gaussian Mechanism [14]) If the `2-norm sensitivity of a deterministic function f is
∆2f , we have:
Mf (G) , f(G) +N (0,∆2f2σ2), (4)
where N (0,∆2f2σ2) is a random variable obeying the Gaussian distribution with mean 0 and
standard deviation ∆2fσ. The randomized mechanism Mf (G) is (ε, δ)-differentially private if
σ ≥√2 ln(1.25/δ)/ε and ε < 1.
In our setting, G is the original training graph. Then Eq. 4 tells us that a link reconstruction based
graph generation modelM can be randomized to ensure (ε, δ)-edge-DP with properly parameterized
Gaussian noise. Therefore, we leverage Theorem 1 by perturbing the gradient optimization of
GraphVAE. In particular, we follow [19] to inject a designed Gaussian noise to the gradients of our
decoder network clipped by a hyper-parameter C as follows
g˜θ =
1
N
N∑
i=1
(∇vi,fLrec/max(1, ∇vi,fLrecC ) +N (0, σ2C2I)), (5)
where ∇vi,fLrec is the original gradient of decoder network on node vi, C is the clipping hyper-
parameter required to bound the influence of each individual node, and σ is the noise scale hyper-
parameter. The idea behind this method is called DPSGD [1]. According to Theorem 1 and the
analysis in [1, 19], a model trained with such distorted gradients is guaranteed to be (ε, δ)-DP.
Since GraphVAE is trained in iterations, to guarantee (ε, δ)-DP in the whole training process,
we leverage the moments accountant mechanism proposed in [1]. Particularly, according to the
composability property of moments accountant, we can accurately bound the total privacy loss of
GraphVAE by setting the degree of perturbation (noise scale) at each training iteration as
σ =
q
√
T log(1/δ)
ε
, (6)
where T is the number of training iterations, and q the sampling ratio. We term this model DPGVAE.
In the generation stage, we can disregard the encoder and only use the decoder to generate an
unlimited amount of graphs from randomly sampled vectors from the prior distribution N (0, I).
Since the normal Gaussian distribution is privacy irrelevant, it can be regarded as (0, 0)-DP. By the
composability property of DP [14], graphs generated by DPGVAE then satisfy (ε, δ)-DP. In particular,
according to Eq. 2, since the decoder network of GraphVAE is essentially generating links, the system
is (ε, δ)-edge-DP, the release of which in principle does not disclose sensitive information regarding
individual links in the original sensitive networks.
Note that, although the encoder network also directly touches sensitive data, according to Eq. 1, the
gradients are already mixed with randomness of samples from the Gaussian prior before reaching
the decoder network, so we do not need to add noise to it. Through this design, we can improve
training of the decoder network with limited privacy gradient budget, with minimum interruptions to
the encoder network, while guaranteeing the whole generation process to be edge-DP.
Improving structure learning. Besides individual link privacy, we also aim to preserve global
network structure so as to ensure the utility of released data. As we discuss before, original GraphVAE
computes the reconstruction loss between input and generated graphs based on the element-wise
BCE between their adjacency matrices. Such a computation is specified on each individual link,
rather than the structure of the graph as a whole. To improve the learning of global graph structure,
we leverage GCN again, which has been shown universally powerful in capturing graph-level
structures [37, 55, 10, 27]. In particular, we borrow the framework of VAEGAN from recent research
[22, 32, 58], and compute a structure-oriented generative adversarial network (GAN) loss as
Lgan = log(D(A)) + log(1−D(A′))
with D(A) = f ′(g′(X,A)), (7)
where g′ and f ′ are GCN and FNN networks similarly as defined before, besides in the end of g′
the node-level representations are element-wise summed up as the graph-level representation, which
resembles the recently proposed GIN model for graph-level representation learning [55]. In the
VAEGAN framework, the decoder also serves as the generator, while D = f ′ · g′ is the discriminator.
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Figure 2: Neural architecture of DPGGEN (best viewed in color): Our novel graph generation
model consists of a GCN-based encoder, an FNN-based decoder (generator), and a GCN+FNN-based
discriminator. Data, modules, and gradients marked red are sensitive, but their flows are blocked by
the green operations (i.e., sampling, gradient clipping, and noise injection), resulting in DP modules
and data, thus eventually protecting individual link privacy.
The intuition behind this novel technique is that, the GCN encodings g′(A) and g′(A′) capture the
graph structures of G and G′, so a reconstruction loss Lrec = ||g′(A) − g′(A′)||22 captures the
intrinsic structural difference between G and G′ instead of the simple sum of the differences over
their individual links. Note that, the effectiveness of our structure-oriented discriminator is critical not
only because it can directly enforce better structure learning of the link-based generator through the
minimax game in Eq. 7, but also because it can learn to relax the penalty on certain individual links,
through flexible and diverse configurations of the whole graph as long as the global structures remain
similar, which exactly fulfills our goals of secure network release. The benefits of such diversity
enabled by the VAEGAN have also been discussed in the cases like image generation [22, 32].
Following [22], the encoder is trained w.r.t. Lrec + λ1Lprior, the decoder (generator) w.r.t. Lrec −
λ2Lgan, and the discriminator w.r.t. λ2Lgan, where λ1 and λ2 are loss weighing hyper-parameters.
To enforce DP constraints and complete our proposed DPGGEN framework, Eq. 5 is applied to
distort the gradients of the discriminator and guarantee the generator to be (ε, δ)-edge-DP, which can
be used to securely generate networks with the other parts disregarded after training. The overall
framework of DPGGEN is shown in Figure 2 above and more training details are put in the Appendix.
4 Experimental Evaluations
We conduct two sets of experiments to evaluate the effectiveness of DPGGEN in preserving global
network structure and protecting individual link privacy. All code and data will be made public upon
the acceptance of this work.
Experimental settings. To provide side-to-side comparison between the original networks and
generated networks, we use two standard datasets of real-world networks, i.e., DBLP and IMDB.
DBLP includes 72 networks of author nodes and co-author links, where the average numbers of
nodes and links are 177.2 and 258; IMDB includes 1500 networks of actor/actress nodes and co-star
links, with average node and link numbers 13 and 65.9. The DBLP networks are constructed based
on research communities, whereas the IMDB networks based on movie genres.
To show that DPGGEN effectively captures global network structure, we compare it against DPG-
VAE under different privacy budgets (controlled by ε in Eq. 6), as well as the original GraphVAE
model [28], regarding a suite of graph statistics commonly used to evaluate the performance of
graph generation models, especially from a global perspective [6, 60, 58].1 Specifically, we train
all compared models from scratch to convergence for K times, where K is the number of networks
in the datasets. Each time, the trained models are used to generate one network, which is to be
compared with the original network regarding the suite of graph statistics. Then we average the
absolute differences between the generated networks and the original networks, which ensures that
the positive and negative differences do not cancel out.
1Statistics we use include LCC (size of largest connected component), TC (triangle count), CPL (characteristic
path length), GINI (gini index), and REDE (relative edge distribution entropy).
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To facilitate better understanding towards how the graph statistics reflect the global network structure
captured by the models, we also provide results of two recent state-of-the-art network generation
methods, i.e., NetGAN [6] and GraphRNN [60], with default parameter settings and no DP constraints
at all. In this experiment, we expect to see the more effective structure-preserving models generate
networks that are more similar to the original ones regarding various graph statistics, thus maintaining
high network data utility. Besides similarity on graph statistics, we further evaluate the utilities of
generated graphs against the original ones on the downstream task of graph classification, of which
the details and results are put in the Appendix due to space limitation.
To show that DPGGEN effectively guarantees individual link privacy, we train all models for another
K times on each dataset. Differently from the previous setting where the complete networks are used,
we randomly sample 80% of the links from the original networks to train the models. After generating
the full networks from the trained models, we use degree distribution to align the nodes in the
generated networks with those in the original networks. Then we evaluate the standard AUC metric
on the task of individual link prediction2 by comparing links predicted in the generated networks
and links hidden during training in the original networks. In this experiment, we expect to see the
more effective privacy-protecting models generate networks that are less useful when used to predict
individual links in the original networks, thus rigorously guaranteeing network data privacy.
For GraphVAE and our models, we use two-layer GCNs with sizes 32→ 16 for both gµ and gσ of the
encoder network, where the first layer is shared, and we use two-layer FNNs with sizes 16→ 32 for
f of the decoder (generator) network. For DPGGEN, we use another two-layer GCN with the same
sizes for g′ and a three-layer FNN with sizes 16→ 32→ 1 for f ′. For DP-related hyper-parameters,
we follow existing works [14, 1, 45] to fix δ to 10−5, noise scale σ to 5, and sampling ratio q to 0.01
(which determines the batch size B as B = qN with N as the graph size). Then we vary ε from 0.1
to 10 to see how much graph-level utilities are preserved under different privacy budgets. According
to Eq. 6, we terminate the training of DPGGENat T iterations when ε is depleted. Other than the
essential parameters in Eq. 6, we empirically set the clipping parameter C to 5, decay ratio γ to 0.99,
learning rate η to 10−3, and the loss weighing parameters λ1 and λ2 both to 0.1. We do not observe
the model to be very sensitive to the setting of these non-essential parameters.
All experiments are done on a server with four GeForce GTX 1080 GPUs and a 12-core 2.2GHz
CPU. The training time of DP-enforced models is often slightly shorter due to early stops when the
privacy budget runs out, (e.g., a typical train of GraphVAE, DPGVAE, and DPGGEN takes 60, 42
and 53 seconds on average on DBLP, respectively). After training, the generation times of the three
models are roughly the same (e.g., 0.02 second on average on DBLP). As a direct comparison, the
state-of-the-art deep network generation models of NetGAN and GraphRNN take longer times under
the same settings especially for generation (e.g., 89 and 4.5 seconds for NetGAN to train and generate
on DBLP, and 75 and 2.4 seconds for GraphRNN). Note that, although efficiency is not our major
concern in this work, short runtimes (especially for generation) are favorable for efficient data share.
DBLP Networks IMDB Networks
Models LCC TC CPL GINI REDE LCC TC CPL GINI REDE
Original 107.5 59.90 3.6943 0.3248 0.9385 13.001 305.9 1.2275 0.1222 0.9894
GraphVAE(no DP) 7.51 66.93 0.1330 0.0213 0.0084 0.0145 25.83 0.0121 0.0030 0.0016
NetGAN(no DP) 9.66 39.87 0.1943 0.0105 0.0022 0.0083 27.54 0.0192 0.0042 0.0011
GraphRNN(no DP) 10.27 57.43 0.2043 0.0415 0.0052 0.0594 27.26 0.0214 0.0155 0.0094
DPGVAE(ε=10) 21.96 175.29 0.2471 0.0339 0.0153 0.0147 43.63 0.0367 0.0036 0.0030
DPGVAE(ε=1) 23.80 187.20 0.3059 0.0343 0.0156 0.0253 43.73 0.0373 0.0038 0.0031
DPGVAE(ε=0.1) 26.07 215.13 0.3342 0.0344 0.0158 0.0320 44.12 0.0392 0.0042 0.0032
DPGGEN(ε=10) 10.61 64.75 0.2035 0.0224 0.0093 0.0040 22.89 0.0164 0.0010 0.0017
DPGGEN(ε=1) 12.38 70.97 0.2643 0.0353 0.0117 0.0053 23.81 0.0168 0.0029 0.0023
DPGGEN(ε=0.1) 24.62 77.41 0.2713 0.0485 0.0191 0.0113 24.91 0.0168 0.0029 0.0025
Table 1: Performance evaluation over compared models regarding a suite of important graph structural
statistics. The Original rows include the values of original networks, while the rest are the average
absolute difference between generated networks by different models and the original networks.
Therefore, smaller values indicate better capturing of global network structure and thus better global
data utility. Bold font is used for values ranked top-3.
2https://github.com/graph-star-team/graph_star
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(a) DBLP (b) IMDB
Figure 3: Accuracy of links predicted based on networks generated by DPGGEN with varying
hyper-parameters and evaluated on the original networks. Lower AUC means the information in the
generated networks is less useful in revealing the true existence or absence of links in the original
networks, thus better individual data privacy.
Performances. In Table 1, our strictly DP-constrained models constantly yield highly competitive
and even better results compared with the strongest DP-free baselines regarding the global network
structural similarity between generated and original networks on both datasets. As we gradually
increase the privacy budget ε, our two models (especially DPGGEN) apparently perform better. The
performance gaps are more significant in the poorer conditions, i.e., on DBLP and regarding the more
community sensitive metrics like LCC and REDE. Such results clearly advocate the advantages of
DPGGEN in capturing global network structure and the effectiveness of our privacy constraints.
Looking deeper into the numbers, we observe that DPGGEN constantly achieves significantly better
performance over DPGVAE under the same privacy budgets on both datasets (scores all passed t-tests
with p-value 0.01), which corroborates our novel model designs. Moreover, the suite of statistics
measure global network structure from different perspectives. As can be inferred from TC, CPL and
GINI, the IMDB networks are in general smaller, tighter and likely more structurally complex than
the DBLP networks, which favors link generation models (e.g., GraphVAE) over sequence generation
models (e.g., NetGAN and GraphRNN), especially regarding the more structure sensitive measures
like TC and CPL. Consequently, our DPGVAE and DPGGEN models also perform better on the
IMDB networks, indicating their advantages on modeling complex link structures.
As shown in Figure 3, for both datasets, links predicted on the networks generated by DPGGEN are
much less accurate than those predicted on the original networks (26%-35% and 15%-20% AUC drops
on DBLP and IMDB, respectively) as well as the networks generated by all baselines. This means that
even the attackers somehow identify nodes in the generated (released) networks, they cannot leverage
the information there to accurately infer the existence or absence of links between particular pairs of
nodes on the original networks. This directly corroborates our claim that DPGGEN is effective in
protecting individual link privacy.
To conduct more detailed inspections, we vary two of the major hyper-parameters, i.e., the privacy
budget ε and sampling ratio q. Consistently with the results in Table 1, larger privacy budgets lead to
more privacy leakage, which allow attackers to infer individual links in the original networks with
higher accuracy. While some DP-constrained deep learning models are observed to be sensitive to
the sampling ratio during training [1, 45], the privacy protection utility of DPGGEN is robust when q
is changed in large ranges in practice.
5 Conclusion
Due to the recent development of deep graph generation models, synthetic networks are generated and
released for granted, without the concern about possible privacy leakage over the original networks
used for model training. In this work, for the first time, we pay attention to the task of secure network
release and formulate its goals as preserving global network structure while protecting individual
link privacy. Subsequently, we adopt the well-studied DP framework and develop DPGGEN,
which protects individual link privacy by enforcing edge-DP over the link prediction based graph
generation model of GraphVAE while preserving global network structure through adversarial
learning with a structure-oriented graph discriminator. Comprehensive experiments show that
DPGGEN is advantageous in generating networks that are globally similar to the original ones (thus
effectively maintaining network data utility), and at the same time useless for predicting individual
links in the original network (thus rigorously protecting network data privacy).
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